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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
IDRC was created to foster research that contributes to sustainable human development,
especially in the South. Within this framework, the Centre has always been committed to
ensuring the utilization of research results by policymakers and others involved in development. 
This paper tells the story of how the Centre`s intent, on linking research and policy processes, has
evolved over the years. It is a small piece of a larger Evaluation Unit study that seeks to
understand how IDRC and its partners have fared in practice, in different countries and on
particular projects, and what lessons might help IDRC more effectively foster research leading to
certain kinds of policy influence. As such this component of the larger study simply tries to
capture what IDRC has been trying to do in this domain since 1970.-
The history of IDRC`s intent can be viewed as a dialectical process, or for the more poetically
inclined, as the story of a work in progress. The debates on the establishment of IDRC highlight
the belief, by the Centre`s architects, that IDRC should support applied as opposed to pure
research. From the outset this included promoting the utilization of research results by
policymakers in developing countries. In the 1970s this idea was put into practice through
projects like the Science and Technology Policy Instruments. Yet the history of STPI highlights
how there was a reluctance in parts of the Centre to support downstream linkages between
research and policymaking, especially if this came at the expense of other Centre priorities such
as responsive programming and respect for the norms of international sovereignty.
In the 1980s this thesis/antithesis dynamic persisted, with the emergence of a new senior
management commitment to the utilization of research results, and new ideas for enhancing
IDRC`s capacity to promote policy changes. Some of these were put into practice, for instance
through the Africa Economic Research Consortium. Yet at the same time certain Board members
and staff continued to express reservations about investing too much in downstream activities,
and interesting ideas for doing so were not always followed through. 
Despite the difficulties created by the Federal Government`s austerity measures, IDRC`s interest
in nurturing policy research endured in the early 1990s, and even flourished in cases like the
South Africa Program Initiative. Yet partly because of the atmosphere of crisis at the time, it
remained difficult to follow up on new ideas in this regard. In the late 1990s and first decade of
this century this thread was picked up with renewed energy, codified in the current Corporate
Strategic Program Framework and in the statement on Closing the Loop. New mechanisms have
been put in place to enhance the Centre`s capacity to program for policy influence. These range
from the allocation of new budgetary resources for policy influencing efforts, to revised job
descriptions for several categories of staff, and new initiatives by Communications Division as
well as Programs & Partnership Branch. Still, some concerns and constraints inherited from
earlier periods endure. The task of refining a corporate strategy to foster research for policy
change, and especially of putting it into practice across the board, remains a work in progress.
1 Report of the Steering Committee, 1968: 15.
2 “IDRC at 30,” IDRC Annual Report 1999-2000, 2000: 34.
3 For a discussion of key concepts such as research utilization and policy influence see
Stephanie Neilson, IDRC-Supported Research and its Influences on Public Policy Knowledge
Utilization and Public Policy Processes: A Literature Review, 2001.
INTRODUCTION
[The Centre] will be designed to facilitate the application of science and
technology and the latest problem-solving techniques to fundamental socio-
economic issues of the less developed regions of the world.  A major part of its
work will be directed to research of the kind which may be utilized by decision-
makers in the formulation and implementation of policies.
Report of the IDRC Steering Committee, 19681
As IDRC embarks on its fourth decade, it is renewing its emphasis on research for
policymaking ... IDRC will increasingly look for opportunities to link research
results more closely to policy and policymaking. 
IDRC at 30, 20002
The conventional wisdom in IDRC today suggests that the Centre was most concerned with
funding rigorous scientific development research in the 1970s, became more committed to
ensuring the utilization of Centre-funded research in the 1980s but only became fully engaged in
fostering research for policy change in the 1990s. Yet the quotes selected above suggest that
IDRC has always been concerned with the practical application of the research it supports,
including the utilization of research in policy making.3
Which version of history is more accurate? How did the Centre arrive at its current commitment
to support research that influences public policymaking? How has IDRC addressed the questions
raised about this goal along the way, at the conceptual and practical levels? 
This paper demonstrates that there has indeed been a persistent concern with the use of research,
albeit in different forms, over three decades of IDRC’s history.  In the early years there was great
interest in the application of scientific and technological knowledge to development problems,
but this included pockets of work at the policy level. In the 1980s interest in the utilization of
research results in policy processes increased considerably and new tools were developed to
facilitate this, yet parts of the Centre remained reluctant to invest in downstream activities.  The
late 1990s witnessed a renewed commitment by senior management to ensuring that IDRC-
supported research had some influence on public policies, and the corresponding development of
new mechanisms to foster such linkages. Yet many of the challenges entailed in fostering
research for policy change, anticipated and intensely debated in earlier times, still endure.
2
4  Fred Carden, Stephanie Neilson et al, “IDRC-supported research in the public policy
process: A strategic evaluation of the influence of research on public policy”, IDRC Evaluation
Unit, October 2001.
METHODOLOGY
This study is based on the analysis of IDRC planning documents, reports, internal papers,
evaluations and reviews, as well as selected Board minutes. External documents were consulted
to understand the context in which IDRC debates took place at various points in time. Interviews
with selected past and present Centre staff as well as senior managers provided valuable
corroboration of the archival material examined. Interviews with Presidents and selected
Governors were envisaged but could not be implemented due to unforeseen constraints.
This is not an assessment of the Centre’s historic performance with regards to linking research
and public policy processes. That is one aim of the larger Evaluation Unit study of which this is
but a component.4 Nor is this a general history of the Centre. A history of the IDRC would
require a far more lengthy and detailed study, as well as a thorough analysis of the external
intellectual and policy contexts in which IDRC has evolved. Those issues are beyond the scope
of this paper, though important events in the wider history of the Centre are discussed in
connection with the evolution of the Centre`s intentions regarding policy research.
THE FIRST DECADE
Precursor debates
The Act of Parliament through which IDRC was created in May 1970 mandated the Centre to:
…initiate, encourage, support and conduct research into the problems of the
developing regions of the world and into the means for applying and adapting
scientific, technical and other knowledge to the economic and social advancement
of those regions… 
The idea of an international development research centre was conceived during a time of great
hope in Canada.  The spectacular growth of the economy in the 1960s, the popularity of
Pearsonian internationalism, Expo 67, Trudeaumania, the creation of the Canadian International
Development Agency and the widespread belief in the power of science and technology – all of
those trends provided an enabling environment for the notion that Canada should host a world
class institution dedicated to international development research. 
Yet there was considerable debate among a small circle of influential officials, advisors and
politicians about the shape that such as centre should take. Some thought that it should facilitate
Canadian scientific research that would be shared with developing countries. Others argued that
3
5 Interview with Geoffrey Oldham, 23 July  2002.  
6 Report of the Steering Committee, 1968: 5.
7 Report of the Steering Committee, 1968:15.
8 Peter  Stockdale, Pearsonian Internationalism in Practice, 1995: 159.
9 The Honourable Mitchell Sharp, Secretary of State for External Affairs, House of
Commons, Standing Committee of External Affairs and National Defence, “Minutes and
Proceedings of Evidence”, No. 13, 11 February 1970,  87-88.
the centre should help build research capacity in developing countries. Most agreed that it should
emphasize applied research rather than basic science.5
These debates were reflected in the seminal 1968 report by the Steering Committee which guided
the creation of the centre. The report came down strongly in favour of the centre supporting
“studies [that] would be ‘action-oriented’ rather than purely theoretical”.6  It recommended that
the centre foster the application of science and technology to the fundamental challenges facing
the less developed world, by building research capacity in those countries as well as by linking
southern researchers to their Canadian and other northern counterparts. The Steering Committee
also explicitly suggested that the centre support research that would be utilized by decision-
makers in the formulation and implementation of policies, on the ground in the South.7
The Steering Committee report led to draft legislation which worked its way through Cabinet and
Parliament. Bill C-12 passed in May 1970 with minimal opposition. There was debate over the
balance of Canadian versus international governors on the Board, the degree of independence it
should have from CIDA and the government of the day, as well as the extent to which the centre
would also nurture the interests Canadian researchers and business enterprises.8 Parliamentarians
understood that international development entailed more than a simple transfer of technology. 
Some were concerned about the implications that an emphasis on applied research, especially
policy research, might have for the principle of not intervening in other countries’ internal affairs.
In response to those concerns the Honourable Mitchell Sharpe, Secretary of State for External
Affairs at the time, reassured parliamentarians that the centre
… does not assume or cannot assume that it has a mandate for social change
anywhere.  It is a provider of techniques, a centre for knowledge, a centre of
resources, which developing countries will be able to draw on ... and adapt to their
own processes of social change over which this institution will have no control.9
In sum, even before IDRC was established its architects envisaged an institution that would
foster applied scientific research in developing countries, including research that would inform
policymaking on the ground. Yet Canadian decision-makers were adamant that this should not
shade into promoting particular strategies for social change: if the research supported by IDRC
4
10  Interview with Geoffrey Oldham, 23 July 2002.
11 Hopper, “Research Policy: Eleven Issues,” IDRC, 1973: 5-15. Emphasis in the original.
12 Regarding the balance between such endeavours, in a 1979 Board meeting Geoffrey
Oldham suggested that senior management aimed to allocate roughly 60% of IDRC’s funds to
“projects which have knowledge generation as their primary objective” and 40% to projects
“which have the development of problem-solving capabilities as their prime objective.” “IDRC
Board of Governor Notes”, March 1-3, 1979: 6.
13 “IDRC at 30", IDRC Annual Report 1999-2000: -28.
14 Ibid.: 29.
had an influence on public policies, this would occur at the initiative of decision-makers and
others in those countries.
The Hopper years, 1970-77
Under David Hopper, the first President of IDRC, the initial challenge was to establish the
infrastructure of a grant-making agency, nurture partnerships with promising research institutions
in developing countries and position the Centre as an independent, global leader in the field of
development research. The Centre grew rapidly as it took on these daunting tasks.
Fostering research that would be picked up by policymakers and other practitioners in developing
countries was certainly one of the Centre’s priorities in the early years. One former senior official
noted that staff were directed to how they could maximize impact in developing countries: “The
discussion was not on whether they should ensure use of research results, but how they should do
so.”10 Yet this commitment had to be balanced against other important objectives. In his key
“Eleven Issues” speech of 1973, Hopper suggested that governing IDRC was a delicate act of
balancing competing goals. This included maintaining a “balance between Centre support for
problem-oriented or applied research, and assistance for phenomenon-oriented or basic
research”, and maintaining the right “balance between Centre assistance for analytical research,
and support for direct, comprehensive action development projects”.11
IDRC balanced these objectives by supporting projects that led to tangible results in addition to
basic scientific research.12 For example in the early 1970s the Agricultural, Food and Nutritional
Sciences Division supported research by the International Centre of Tropical Research in
Colombia which led to the development of new varieties of cassava and the eventual quadrupling
of average cassava yields in several countries.13 In the mid-1970s the Information Sciences
Division supported research that led to the creation of MINISIS, a computer-based information
management system that has been widely used in over 60 countries.14 Though some of these
5
15 This emphasis on the practical transfer of technologies is captured by Hopper’s
observation that IDRC’s unique product was the “creation, adaptation, and implantation of
technology to ‘accelerate the blurring of the line between deep poverty and towering affluence
that now separates the mass of mankind from the few’”. See With Our Own Hands, 1987: 9.  
16 Academy of Scientific Research and Technology, Egypt, “Science and Technology
Policy Instruments STPI General Report,” 1979: 1.
17 They were intrigued by three such models: 1) the limestone model, whereby some
research results gradually seep into policy processes; 2) the gadfly model, whereby researchers
achieve influence through public lectures, op ed articles and other ad hoc mechanisms; 3) the ant
colony model, whereby researchers influence by entering public service or participating in state-
led policy option explorations. STPI’s approach attempted to synthesize and move beyond the
best elements of these models. Interview with Geoffrey Oldham, 23 July 2002. It is interesting to
compare these models to the contemporary explanatory frameworks discussed in Neilson, 2001.
18 IDRIS, project number 760004. It is difficult to do justice, in a few sentences, to a
project that involved over 150 researchers in 10 countries and generated over 200 reports.
initiatives led to policy changes, many were primarily directed at generating technologies that
could lead to practical change without passing through complex public policy processes.15  
The Social Sciences Division was perhaps most supportive of research directly linked to public
policy processes. A high-profile initiative in this regard was the Science and Technology Policy
Instruments project. STPI aimed to study and influence science and technology (S&T) policies in
the South.  During its first phase the project nurtured research and exchanges among developing
country research teams working on S&T policy problems. The essential conclusions of STPI
were that science and technology policy could be a valuable tool for national development, that
policies should be adapted to the particular situation of each country, but that in all cases there
should be an enabling macro-economic, fiscal, legal and institutional environment to facilitate
the effective implementation of targeted S&T policies.16 
Through their involvement in this research STPI staff became aware of different models
purporting to explain the relationships between scientific research and policy processes.17 They
applied these theoretical insights to the design of new activities and as a result Phase II focused
on the dissemination of findings and the direct engagement of national policymakers.18  Briefing
papers and monographs were published in different languages. Three major policy dialogue
conferences were held in Africa and one in Asia. In some countries STPI projects showed early
successes. For example, in Korea the head of the STPI team was a close friend of the Prime
Minister`s Chief Economic Advisor and the project was able to significantly influence Korean
S&T policy. The STPI project also contributed to the agenda and discussions at the 1979 UN
Conference on Science and Technology in Vienna. Two keys to this influence were the
6
19 Interview with Geoffrey Oldham. On the impact of the 1979 UN Conference, see also
Geoffrey Oldham, “Time is Important,” Mazingira: The World Forum for Environment and
Development, 8:65 (1979): .59-65. The STPI staffer in question was Fransisco Sagasti. As an
IDRC governor decades later, Dr. Sagasti apparently played a key role in nurturing senior
management’s commitment to fostering synergies between research and policy processes.
20 Interview with Geoffrey Oldham. This was also discussed by the Board, albeit
indirectly. See Board of Governors notes, “Draft notes of proceedings,” March, 1979: 3, 5.
21 With Our Own Hands, 1979.  
22 Fox, “Support for Social Sciences Research in the Southern Cone” Vol. I, 1980: 4.
secondment of an STPI staff member to the UN conference planning secretariat, and the strategic
use of STPI findings to lobby G-77 delegates in the lead-up to the UN conference.19 
Yet STPI sparked intense debates over how much the Centre should fund such downstream
activities. Some IDRC officials felt that investing too much in this kind of activity could
jeopardize the Centre’s capacity to respond to proposals for other worthy research projects. In the
end STPI was not able to secure IDRC funding for a major dissemination event planned in Latin
America.20 Phase II was completed but no similar successor initiatives were put in place.
Prior to the 1979 UN Conference IDRC also published a compendium of articles on its
achievements. Some southern contributions to this volume examined the difficulties of achieving
policy influence through the kind of research typically supported by IDRC. Some authors
suggested that much of the research being conducted with IDRC support was only of benefit to
the researchers’ own career advancement. They observed that some researchers were not
particularly interested in following up on their research.  Many of the researchers in the South, as
they were educated in the North, conducted research that was highly specialized and somewhat
disconnected from the needs of the people. The agencies that partnered with IDRC were not
necessarily risk-takers. This made it difficult to organize interdisciplinary action research. 
Finally, most southern governments were concerned with crisis management and were not
necessarily acting for the long-term. In such contexts the creation of indigenous research capacity
did not automatically result in policy influence; nor did dissemination ensure utilization.21 
It is also during this period that IDRC decided to support a cluster of projects that were not about
achieving policy influence in the short run. In 1977 IDRC started providing institutional support
for research centres in South American countries where military regimes had taken power,
gravely violated human rights, closed down social science faculties and eliminated the channels
of policy dialogue with all but their trusted allies.22 This decision was intensely debated by senior
management and by the Board, not least because of the political risks involved. Indeed, these
were circumstances under which IDRC had decided to take sides, against the de facto authorities,
in the hope that its support would contribute to change or at least help researchers, their ideas and
institutions survive in politically hostile environments.
7
23 For a broader study of the long term impacts of IDRC support to key researchers, see
Stephen Salewicz and Archana Dwivedi, Project Leader Tracer Study, 1996.
24 PPR I, 1980: 67. 
25 The Honorable Rex Nettleford, Governor from Jamaica, quoted in “Special Report: Ten
Years for tomorrow”, no date: 3.
Interestingly this support for Southern Cone researchers eventually became one of IDRC’s
success stories, since the Centre could claim partial credit for sustaining the critical intellectual
tradition in countries such as Argentina and Chile during their darkest years. Though little of this
research probably had direct policy influence at the time, IDRC reaped the benefits of its long
association with key researchers when many of these moved into positions of influence under the
democratic governments that came to office in the 1980s.23
THE SECOND DECADE
The Head years, 1978-1991
IDRC remained officially committed to the utilization of research in the 1980s, but the debate on
how much IDRC should foster this goal continued. The first Program and Policy Review
presented to the Board in 1980 highlighted the technical difficulties involved:
It is recognized that in some programs it is possible to identify the end-user, whilst
in others the establishment of a direct link with the end-user will not always be
possible and the policy linkage may not, in fact, take place until several years after
project completion.  The Board may wish to address the issue of whether a policy
link is in fact a necessary objective of Centre supported programs or whether the
enhancement of research capability by itself would be adequate.24 
The possible implications of intervening in other countries’ political affairs also remained a
concern, though some believed that IDRC staff and their contacts were well-positioned to
achieve influence without engaging in politics. As one Governor stated: 
... no IDRC or other outside agency can go into another political jurisdiction and
dictate what is to be done.  This is one of the reasons why emphasis has been
placed, quite frankly, on the professional capabilities of the IDRC rather than the
political.  The respect that the IDRC professionals have gained has given them
access to the sort of people in different parts of the developing world who will
ensure that the projects benefit the large mass of people.”25 
To ground this debate in evidence, in 1981 senior management recommended that the Office of
Planning and Evaluation (OPE) carry out project case studies “to try to identify why the results
8
26 PPR III, 1981: 17.  
27 “When considering policy alternatives, the “steady as you go” option deserves as much
objective consideration as any other.  It always has appeal, but is particularly attractive for IDRC
which already has a good international reputation that could be put at risk by a deeper
involvement with development, as opposed to research.” See John Hardie, “Using Knowledge for
Development”, IDRC, 1982: 8.
28 Ibid.: 2.
29 Some of these ideas were put into practice in the 1980s, for example through the
introduction of questions on beneficiary involvement in project appraisal and project completion
report templates. Other ideas were not taken up until much later: for example it took two decades
for the idea of conducting systematic research on the results of IDRC-supported research to be
put into practice through the Evaluation Unit’s major policy influence study in 2001-2003.
30 “Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Board of Governors of the International
Development Research Centre to review the Social Sciences Division,” 1984: 18 (Annex G -
attachment).  
were utilized in some cases and not in others.”26 The idea of case studies was not followed up
until later but the OPE carried out a preliminary study on the matter. The resulting paper noted
the existence of multiple views within the Centre: some saw utilization as a linear process while
others viewed it as a more iterative process of generating, receiving, absorbing and generating
new knowledge. The study noted observed that it was not easy to distinguish between research
that promoted knowledge and that which promoted its use. It confirmed a shared concern that
moving more decisively towards utilization could curtail the Centre’s responsiveness.27  Yet it
also intimated that, at the end of the day, IDRC would be “assessed by its association with
research work that has contributed in some way to social and economic advance.”28 
In the end the OPE study suggested that there could be more emphasis on consolidating existing
projects instead of taking on new ones, yet it also suggested that IDRC should continue to
support projects that resulted from southern demands. It recommended that the Centre and its
partners clarify at the outset how beneficiaries would be involved in projects.  The study also
suggested that pilot projects be undertaken to apply the results of research, and that there should
be more “research on research” to track the results of IDRC supported research.
The extent to which these recommendations were translated into practice is not clear, yet the
debate on policy influence continued.29 In 1984 a Board Committee which reviewed the Social
Sciences Division noted that there was “good research being produced, but links to policy
process are weak, hence IDRC goals should be organizational and provide small financial
contributions to help bridge the research-to-policy formulation gap.”30  There was persistent
trepidation, though, about IDRC`s involvement in the political imbroglios of other countries. In
terms of the criteria for selection of projects, it was found that:
9
31 Ibid.: 25.
32 Interview with James Mullin, 29 July 2002.
33 IDRIS description for project 870112. See also IDRIS descriptions for projects 830099,
850055, 850057, 860292, 910035 and 000882. Mullin also cited AERC as an example of what
IDRC could do when it dedicated its resources to fostering research-policy linkages. 
34 “Strategic Plan of the Social Sciences Division, 1988-1992": iv.     
In many nations, the priority of different policy questions is viewed differently
depending who one speaks to.  The Division seeks not to become identified with
any particular ideological or partisan view on policy issues, but to support
research which will illuminate the issues for all involved.31
Despite these debates there seems to have been frustration among certain senior managers with
the difficulties of moving the research utilization agenda forward in practice. At President Head’s
initiative senior management held a 10 week seminar in 1985 to reflect on strategic challenges
facing the Centre. According to one participant the main driver behind the meeting was the
feeling that IDRC had too little to show for its efforts over the past 15 years. In addition, many
Centre staff didn’t seem to understand or share the commitment to support initiatives that linked
research directly to policy processes. The limestone model of high quality research permeating
into policy processes still seemed to dominate staff thinking. As such the seminar attempted to
generate senior management commitment to support more inter-disciplinary research, and to
more actively foster the utilization of research in practical and policy processes.32 
The evolution of IDRC’s involvement in African economic research networks during the 1980s
illustrates how this renewed senior management interest in policy processes led to changes in
practice. In 1984 IDRC made its first grant to the Eastern and Southern Africa Macroeconomic
Analysis Program. The primary aim of the program was to build the policy research capacity of
economists in Sub-Saharan Africa. As such the emerging network engaged university-based
economists as well as analysts working inside African government agencies. By the late 1980s,
on the basis of solid research, publications and conferences, IDRC and its African partners
managed to transform the network into the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) and
get a number of larger donors to contribute to its core operations. One of its key aims since has
been to “improve relationships between researchers and policymakers” through research
activities, conferences as well as workshops aimed specifically at public decision-makers.33 
Notwithstanding such advances, some IDRC managers wanted the Centre to move even more
decisively towards linking research and policy influence. In 1988 the Social Sciences Division
tabled a Strategic Plan with commitments to “emphasize persistence in capacity building and
increasing the utilization of research results” and “put more resources into the downstream end of
its projects”.34  The document outlined plans to work with other Divisions, especially
Communications, to ensure that other researchers as well as policymakers and the public were
10
35 While dissemination was the process of making the results of research accessible,
utilization involved the application of these outputs in areas which could effect various changes
in society.  See PPR X, 1988: 7. See also “A Utilization Framework for IDRC Projects” (1989),
in which André Potworowski outlined an eight-point framework for thinking about utilization in
IDRC-supported research projects. Among other things, he noted that there was no silver bullet
for identifying which research could be utilized. In many cases in the South, resources for
dissemination simply did not exist, and the burden of application rested on the shoulders of the
innovator. In these situations, he argued, IDRC should be discerning about project selection.
36 PPR X, 1988: 2-3.  
37 PPR X, 1988: 10-11.
38 Rath, “Science and Technology Policy Review,” 1988: 4.  
aware of research supported by IDRC. It also sketched plans to create an experimental
subprogram on Public Policy and Participation.
That same year the new Vice-President of Programs Branch, James Mullin, presented a Program
and Policy Review that concentrated on the issue of utilization. PPR X distinguished between
utilization, dissemination and impact. It further distinguished between different types of research
and context-sensitive approaches to promoting its utilization.35 In the end it did not recommend
major structural changes or the generation of new demands on staff to transform their
programming methods; instead it recommended that training be provided and experiments
conducted to ease into this new approach. The Review also indicated that the Communications
Division would look at new ways to focus on dissemination and utilization of research outputs.36  
A study was commissioned to consult a sample of South Asian researchers on this issue.
According to the study researchers felt that IDRC interests were still confined to research and
that utilization, beyond limited dissemination, was outside the scope of most projects.
Researchers’ interest in utilization was generally in terms of exchange between other researchers
and/or institutions.  Moreover, the standard three to five year period was seen to be too short to
undertake any major utilization activity.  If utilization was stressed, it would require longer term
support and structural changes to projects.  There would also need to be more formal linkage
mechanisms between research centres and policymaking institutions.37 
Similarly a review of the Science and Technology Policy of the Social Sciences Division
observed that while it was important to support activities concentrating on S&T policy, the
linkages between these activities remained weak and ad hoc.  Without recommending specific
institutional changes, it recommended that “any new structure must be designed to improve the
total impact of the Centre in generating policy-relevant knowledge and its utilization both in the
developing countries and by IDRC itself.”38  
Despite these shifts in the views of certain senior managers and southern partners, there were
11
39 “Report of the In-Depth Divisional Review Panel, Social Sciences Division,” 1988: 79. 
One senior manager who has been involved in these debates for over twenty years suggested that
the resistance to Mullin’s thinking in PPR X undermined its impact on IDRC. Interview with
John Hardie, 5 June 2002.
40 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 1988: 4.31. 
persistent concerns about increased spending that could result from greater emphasis on
utilization. PPR X did not elicit universal approval among governors, management and staff. For
example, in 1988 the Board’s In-Depth Review of the Social Sciences Division concluded: “We
are somewhat reassured by the concomitant statement, with which we agree, that ‘the Division
should not direct large amounts of funding to the support of downstream activities’.”39  
In sum, during the 1980s lively debate continued on how and how much IDRC should support
activities linking research to policy. A more sophisticated view of research utilization challenges
was emerging on the basis of the Centre’s own experience and its engagement in international
discussions. Numerous studies, reviews and plans were tabled to address these challenges. New
initiatives like the Africa Economic Research Consortium were launched to put the Centre’s
thinking into practice. Yet some debates and recommendations were becoming repetitive.
Programming innovations such as the initiative on public policy and participation were not
sustained. The Centre also seemed to have difficulties moving beyond old dichotomies such as
consolidation versus responsiveness, or scientific rigour versus political intervention. 
To put this in context, it is worth remembering that despite these iterative internal debates, in
1988 IDRC received commendation from the Auditor General of Canada. IDRC was identified as
one of eight “well performing government organizations”.  The section on IDRC concluded:
We have looked at IDRC from the point of view of its internationally recognized
high performance in delivering research assistance to developing nations.  IDRC
is considered worldwide to be one of the best organizations of its kind.  Its high
performance is based on a number of elements: people who are competent,
committed and value-driven; continuity of leadership; a clear and strong sense of
mission and purpose; a strong client focus; autonomy and flexibility at all levels;
risk-taking and innovation; freedom from political and central agency
interference; tailor-made internal regulations and reporting requirements; and
continual self-scrutiny of strategies and activities.40
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42 Empowerment Through Knowledge: The Strategy of the International Development
Research Centre, 1991: 7-8.  
43 Empowerment Through Knowledge, 1991: 23.
44 See also “Transition Budget: IDRC, 1992-93": 48.
THE 1990s AND BEYOND
The Bezanson years: 1991-1997
Despite its achievements during the first decades of its existence, IDRC was vulnerable when
pressures to dramatically cut federal expenditures intensified in the early 1990s. In 1991 the
Centre faced the possibility of being closed down, along with several other crown corporations
and federal bodies. In 1992 the government considered making IDRC a departmental corporation
of CIDA. The Centre experienced large cuts in its parliamentary allocation: from $120 million in
1992 to $86 million by 1998. Responding to these external challenges absorbed the Centre’s
energies under the Presidency of Keith Bezanson.41 
Bridging the gap between the research it supported and its utilization in policy processes was a
small but crucial element in IDRC’s response to these challenges. In 1991 the Centre unveiled a
new strategy titled Empowerment Through Knowledge which  reiterated IDRC’s commitment to
“consolidate ... itself as a results-oriented, ‘research-for-development’ organization”.42  The
strategy also outlined plans to foster “research on effective research systems”, a notion that
echoed the idea of ‘research on research’ mooted back in 1982:
The Centre will intensify its efforts to assess “what works” in development
research.  Little information exists on how research for development is best
organized or how to ensure that the products of useful research can be more
speedily and widely applied.  A new program will be developed to support
research on such topics.  It will draw on the accumulated experience of the
Centre’s own evaluation program.  The new program will pay particular attention
to the important question of how to improve policy research – the formulation,
packaging, and application of knowledge for policymaking.43 
Related commitments to a “finer focus on policy research” were made in other documents44 yet
the pressure of fiscal cutbacks made it difficult to follow these up in practice. 
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development presented the Centre a
timely opportunity to demonstrate its usefulness and thereby manage these fiscal pressures. At
the Rio Earth Summit the international community committed itself to ‘Agenda 21', an ambitious
program of measures to reverse environmental degradation and promote sustainable
development. Canada was deeply engaged in shaping the Rio Agenda. During this period IDRC
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46 Bezanson, “Research for Development” in Diplomat and International Canada, 1993:
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47 Interviews with John Hardie, 5 June 2002 and Jim Mullin, 29 July 2002.  African
Community Access to the Communications and Information Age (ACACIA) is another example
of IDRC programming for policy and practical change during this period. See Beemans, 1999,
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officials and allies persuaded Canadian decision-makers that the Centre could play a key role in
fostering the multi-disciplinary, collaborative research needed to implement Agenda 21. As a
result soon after the Rio Summit Prime Minister Mulroney declared IDRC an Agenda 21
organization, thereby confirming the Centre’s survival as an independent crown corporation.
IDRC launched extensive internal and external consultations to update the 1991 strategy based
on this new focus. In 1993 it decided that all programming would be dedicated to sustainable
development and half of the Centre’s funds would go to six themes linking environmental and
natural resource management to the broader development agenda.45 In an interview for a DFAIT
publication President Bezanson explained this revised strategy and highlighted how the
principles of Agenda 21 were a good match for the Centre: 
It was clear that the strategy provided a strong comparative advantage in
responding to Rio, including a focus on capacity-building; insistence on
multidisciplinary and multi-sectoral approaches; priority to the generation,
adaptation and dissemination of essential knowledge on the full participation of
policy-users and policy-makers; and focus on research utilization.46
This interview was part of the outreach that IDRC officials intensified to build support among
decision-makers in the Prime Minister’s Office, the departments of Finance and Foreign Affairs,
CIDA as well as the broader Canadian development community. The Centre’s commitment to
applied research and engagement with policymakers was a crucial part of President Bezanson’s
case for granting IDRC resources to foster research for the implementation of Agenda 21.
During the following years the Centre was absorbed with the task of re-engineering itself to
deliver this strategy. To nurture more multi-disciplinary research on sustainable development the
divisional structure was replaced by clusters and finally by program initiatives. The number of
staff was reduced by almost 50%. This limited resources available to enhance research-policy
links. Yet interesting initiatives emerged. For instance, in South Africa from 1991 onward IDRC
supported research by the democratic movement and the African National Congress, on a range
of industrial, environmental and social policy issues. This assistance is credited with having a
significant influence on the public policies of the first ANC government in a number of sectors.47 
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The O`Neil years, 1997- 
From the outset of her tenure President Maureen O`Neil signaled her keen interest in enhancing
the linkages between IDRC-supported research and public policy processes. A discussion
emerged between the new President, certain governors, senior managers and staff on how the
Centre could move decisively forward on this score. The Evaluation Unit’s work on “outcome
mapping” and Policy Planning Group’s initial thinking on “building a knowledge pyramid”
exemplify the interest that was percolating below the surface. Yet during this period IDRC was
largely dedicated to ensuring the delivery of the 1997-2000 Corporate Program Framework and
fine-tuning changes introduced under President Bezanson.48
It is during the formulation and implementation of the 2000-2005 Corporate Strategic
Programming Framework (CSPF III) that major changes were introduced to advance the policy
influence agenda. A renewed intent to foster “research for policymaking” was unequivocally
stated in CSPF III and in the Centre’s 1999-2000 Annual Report.49 Over the ensuing years this
was refined into a policy statement on what became known as “Closing the loop” (CTL):
Closing the loop is an approach to programming and projects that seeks to ensure
the awareness, understanding, and ownership of research outputs by decision-
makers at all levels. Its goals are to increase the relevance and utilization of
research outputs, thereby enhancing the influence of the researchers, institutions
and work we support.50
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53 Carden and Neilson, “IDRC-supported research in the public policy process,” 2001.
The January 2002 CTL statement outlines the factors that shape prospects for research-based
policy influence. These include project-level factors such as the involvement of potential users in
the design and conduct of the research, as well as adequate financial resources for high-quality
research and the strategic dissemination of its results. It also includes contextual factors such as
the existence of a favourable policy environment, users’ interest in the research and the existence
of credible champions. Based on this analysis the statement highlights steps that should be taken
by IDRC and its partners to align enabling factors at the project and contextual levels. It
emphasizes that closing the loop needs to be mainstreamed at all stages in the design, funding,
research, dissemination, monitoring and evaluation of projects as well as programs.  As such the
statement aims to send “a clear message that IDRC wants to be seen as strongly pro-active in its
commitment to research for development” including achieving an “increase [in]the reach of
outputs ... to policymakers, donors, development institutions and other stakeholders ...”
In 2000 the Centre began introducing a number of new mechanisms to operationalise this
enhanced commitment to policy research. The Communications Division was reorganised and
allocated more resources to strengthen its capacity to synthesize the results of IDRC-supported
research and translate them into policy briefs, presentations to parliamentary committees, media
coverage and enhanced website. It intensified its collaboration with the President’s Office to
convey timely messages to Canadian decision-makers through strategic interpersonal
communications. These efforts have already generated new grants from the Canadian
government for the establishment, by IDRC, of connectivity institutes in the Americas and in
Africa.51 Communications and Programs & Partnership Branch were jointly allocated an extra
$500,000 to deliver a series of policy workshops in which IDRC-supported research was
presented to Canadian policymakers. When staff job descriptions were updated in 2001 regional
directors, program area directors and program officers were given greater responsibility for
tracking policy debates and facilitating influence by IDRC-supported researchers. 
Finally, two major initiatives were launched to translate the idea of ‘research on research’ into
reality. The first is the Research on Knowledge Systems (RoKS) exploration, an initiative to
explore “the ways in which knowledge is produced, communicated and applied to development
problems, and the policy and institutional frameworks which govern this process”.52 The second
is the corporate strategic evaluation of how IDRC-supported research has, over time, influenced
public policy processes. This large study includes a foundational literature review and concept
papers, analyses of key  IDRC documents such as project completion reports from a policy
influence angle, and over 25 case studies of IDRC-supported projects from the same standpoint.53
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CONCLUSIONS
In recent years IDRC has made much progress in its efforts to foster research that influences
policy processes. These advances build on earlier intentions, debates and initiatives. The renewed
commitment to research for change – enshrined in the current Corporate Strategic Program
Framework – builds on longstanding institutional intentions. Indeed, this intent to foster applied
research and its utilization in public policy processes can be traced back to debates on the
establishment of IDRC in the late 1960s. The strategy codified in the Closing the Loop statement
also reflects an accumulation of knowledge about how research and policy processes are linked
in different contexts, and how IDRC can nurture such linkages in practical ways. Many of the
innovations introduced in recent years were also mooted or even tried tried in earlier eras: this is
the case with efforts to strengthen Communications Division, allocate more resources to
downstream products, and foster “research on research” through the RoKs exploration. What is
new is the depth and breadth of commitment among senior managers, the sophistication of the
current strategy and especially the concerted effort to put renewed intent into practice. What is
new this time is that the tension between research for influence and other agendas has been
resolved in favour of the former. Indeed it is interesting to observe how old constraints – such as
the priority given to remaining responsive to recipients’ agendas, or the concern about
intervening in other countries’ politics – have largely been transcended in the new outlook.
The vision and persistence of President O’Neil, and the support of key staff as well as governors,
have been essential to translating this old idea into a coherent strategy. The confluence of factors
outside IDRC – including the renewed interest in policy dialogue and influence in international
development circles, the pressure to demonstrate results on the ground and gain profile in
Canada, and the slow but steady increase in governmental funding for IDRC – have also
provided favourable conditions for these champions’ efforts. As such the Centre’s own
experience over the past decades illustrates the slow, difficult and multi-causal nature of
processes whereby ideas lead to change in policy and practice. Borrowing the metaphors used by
the Science & Technology Policy Instruments project in the mid-1970s, once could say that it has
taken gadflies, ants and a favourable climate for the limestone of research for policy influence to
seep into ground and flower into the coherent strategy for Closing the Loop that exists today.
Yet history also suggests that the challenge of putting this intent into practice will endure. The
Centre will continue to grapple with the difficulty of allocating sufficient funds for policy
influencing efforts over the longer term, particularly if the fiscal situation becomes less
favourable in the future. It may have to address possible trade-offs between seeking influence in
Canada, in tandem with resource expansion efforts, and supporting partners’ efforts to influence
public policymaking on the ground in developing countries. The Centre may need to revisit its
staffing strategy to ensure that it recruits sufficient personnel with deep experience at the
interface of research and policymaking, and it may need to provide more time and training to
enable staff to nurture research-policy synergies systematically. The dialectic will continue, the
gadflies and the ants will be busy. For the task of refining the Centre’s intent on policy influence,
and translating it into practice, will remain a work in progress for some time to come.
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Brent Herbert-Copley and Paul Dufour (RoKS).  In-person interview, May 14, 2002.
Anne Bernard.  Phone interview, May 16, 2002.
John Hardie.  In-person interview, June 5, 2002.
Geoffrey Oldham.  Phone interview, July 23, 2002.  
Jim Mullin, phone interview, 29 July 2002.
(I also had conversations with Chris Smart, Leanne Burton and Jean-Marc Fleury).  
Plus list of all those who attended focus group session on 9 April 2002.
